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‘Neo-Hindutva’: Evolving forms, spaces, and expressions of Hindu nationalism  
 
Indian politics is in a state of considerable flux and Hindu nationalism has emerged as a more 
dominant political force than ever before. Recent years have seen an unprecedented surge in 
the electoral prospects of the leading Hindu nationalist political force, the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP). It came to power with its first overall majority in 2014 following an innovative 
and resoundingly successful campaign by its controversial leader, Narendra Modi, and party 
president, Amit Shah. They were helped by Congress ineffectiveness, accusations of 
corruption, and lacklustre leadership, enabling the BJP to lead the country for the first time 
since their National Democratic Alliance coalition government a decade earlier.  
But 2014 was by no means the apex of the ‘Saffron Wave’ (Hansen 1999). At the 
state level, the BJP has gone from ruling 7 of 29 states at the point of Modi’s national 
election victory to, at the time of writing, holding power in 21 states (which contain more 
than 70 per cent of the country’s population). Hindutva since 2014 appears to be more 
confident, proud, brazen, and belligerent than ever before. Hindu nationalist political 
hegemony is such that actions which earlier might have been unimaginable are now a reality: 
a firebrand preacher appointed Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, a Union Minister garlanding 
men convicted of lynching a Muslim trader in Jharkhand, state-sanctioned ‘anti-Romeo’ 
squads hounding interfaith couples. This level of political ‘saffronisation’ seems to suggest, 
according to Christophe Jaffrelot, that India could be heading ‘toward a Hindu state’ (2017). 
Hindutva’s ambitions go considerably beyond the ballot box. The movement is 
committed to root-and-branch societal transformation – in the form of a so-called ‘Hindu 
Renaissance’ – and to this end have made inroads into education, development, the 
environment, industry, culture, and almost every other aspect of public life. The Hindu 
nationalist movement has always been diverse and multifaceted: the Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh (RSS) has long presided over an extended and ever-growing parivar (family) of 
organisations that share many of its ideological underpinnings (Jaffrelot 2005). The exact 
relationship between these diverse institutions remains something of a moot point, but here is 
not the place to deliberate whether they are close-knit divisions of the RSS or simply, as they 
often insist, autonomous but ‘inspired’ by the Sangh. What is clear, however, is that despite 
overlapping principles, goals, methods, and personnel, there are also moments when 
differences emerge. These groups of the parivar have grown and evolved over the past 
decade, increasingly making their presence felt across Indian society. With government-
backing, organisations and individuals who previously were peripheral and considered 
outlandish, now have a seat at the table: whether deciding educational policy and running 
universities, or through appointments to cultural institutions, economic bodies, and even the 
judiciary. 
What has also happened is that Hindutva has developed and spread far beyond the 
organisational network that is conventionally linked, directly or indirectly, to the RSS. To 
identify this is not to suggest it is an entirely new phenomenon, per se: Savarkar’s Essentials 
of Hindutva and the Hindu Mahasabha both predate the RSS, and the ‘ownership’ of 
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Hindutva ideology is continually contested and reshaped. As William Gould (2004) and 
others have shown, Hindu nationalism and communalism even pervaded the political 
language and symbolism of the Indian National Congress from the late colonial period. Even 
today, politicians from across the spectrum – not least Rahul Gandhi’s Congress – are 
accused of ‘soft Hindutva’ when choreographing conspicuously Hindu-inflected campaign 
strategies and photo opportunities. Hindu nationalism, therefore, is not to be understood as a 
neatly-definable ideology, nor one that has ever been limited to just ‘outwardly’ communal, 
or even political, institutions and actors. Equally, this special issue does not assume any kind 
of ‘Hindutva orthodoxy’: whilst in principle the Sangh is fundamentally prescriptive, and the 
ideology of Hindutva emphasises unity and psychological conformity, it is very clear that the 
Sangh Parivar more broadly is heterodox. This is partly by design: an effective ‘division of 
labour’ (Jaffrelot 1996, 123) that is often to its overall advantage. It is also sometimes 
wracked by internal dispute. Consider, for instance, the breadth of attitude, often 
diametrically opposed, towards economic liberalisation, or the recent tensions between VHP 
President, Pravin Togadia, and the BJP. 
But Hindutva is ever-changing. The Sangh Parivar formulation – the ‘big three’ of the 
RSS, VHP, and BJP, as well as the dozens of closely connected groups, from the Bharatiya 
Mazdoor Sangh (trade union) and Kisan Sabha (farmers’ union), to Vidya Bharati 
(educational network), the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (student union), and the 
Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram (‘tribal welfare’ organisation) – fails to encompass the full diversity 
and multipolarity of Hindutva. Hindu nationalism now permeates into new spaces: 
institutional, territorial, conceptual, ideological. These developments raise questions which 
require us to reframe prevailing understandings of Hindutva. How have the internet and 
social media changed Hindu nationalism? What are we to make of Hindutva-sympathetic 
gurus and ‘godmen’, seemingly ever-more politically involved? Where are we to locate 
Hindutva in the 21st century? It has clearly long outgrown its ‘Maharashtrian crucible’ 
(Jaffrelot 2007, 14), but what are its geographical limits within India: is it truly pan-national, 
and how is it differently inflected in urban and rural settings? What of the famously BJP-
supporting NRIs: why does Hindutva appeal to Indians overseas? Does it reproduce and 
mimic the homeland ideology, or does Hindutva have distinctive appeal and 
vernacularisation in the diaspora? To what degree is 2014 a rupture – does it represent a 
paradigm shift for Hindutva? How substantially has the Modi era changed Hindu nationalism, 
and India, more broadly? And how can we understand the relationship between Hindu 
nationalism and the judiciary, between Hindutva, charity and development? This special issue 
seeks to address these questions, and more. 
 
‘Neo-Hindutva’ 
The special issue emerges from an article, also in Contemporary South Asia, which proposed 
the term ‘neo-Hindutva’ as a way to identify and understand ‘idiosyncratic expressions of 
Hindu nationalism which operate outside of the institutional and ideological framework of 
the Sangh Parivar’ (Anderson 2015, 47). Edward Anderson’s framing of ‘neo-Hindutva’ 
drew on Reddy’s identification of Hindutva’s ‘diffuse logic’, which is both nebulous and in 
process, and can become ‘a mediating discourse in its own right’ (2011, 421). A number of 
people have noticed the particularly striking way in which expatriate Hindu nationalism is 
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distinctive and hybrid, replete with ‘vernacular forms that negotiate local legal, social, moral, 
and political environments in ways that variously concentrate or dilute their ideological 
emphases’ (Reddy 2012). This corpus of work includes, amongst others, scholarship on the 
US by Vijay Prashad (2001, 2013), Prema Kurien (2007), and Martha Nussbaum (2007), and 
research on Britain by Dhooleka Raj (2003) and John Zavos (2008). Others have identified 
how Hindu nationalism has evolved in new ways in India and transnationally, through the 
media (Rajagopal 2001; Udupa 2015), the internet (Lal 1999, Therwath 2012), pedagogical 
sites (Sarkar 2002; Sutton 2018), gurus and their followers (McKean 1996; Nanda 2009), the 
visual landscape (Brosius 2005), across gender and sexuality (Sarkar and Butalia 1995), and 
yet more diffuse locations and discourses, domestic and global (Zavos et al 2012; Doniger 
and Nussbaum 2015; Basu 2017).  
Another intervention that has analysed the stretched territorial and religious contexts 
in which we find Hindutva, and which this special issue also expands upon, is the work of 
Arkotong Longkumer (2017), who examines the activities of the Sangh Parivar in Northeast 
India. A region traditionally seen as a recalcitrant periphery, unable to integrate with the ‘idea 
of India’ through numerous ethnic nationalisms (Baruah 2005; Longkumer 2018), the 
Northeast is increasingly seen as a ‘Hindutva laboratory’ (Spondek 2010). It has become a 
testing place not only for Hindutva’s ability to re-fashion itself in new spaces, but also to re-
form their core ideologies, such as Savarkar’s notion of religious belonging through ties to 
land, in new ways (Longkumer forthcoming).This special issue adds to and builds on the 
work of these scholars and others who have identified the multifarious nature, and fuzzy 
edges, of contemporary Hindu nationalism. 
Anderson (2015) proposed two ‘categories’ of neo-Hindutva: ‘hard’ – not reticent 
about being connected with Hindu nationalism, but, for various reasons, often departing from 
the positioning and praxis of the Sangh; and ‘soft’ – often more concealed and prone to avoid 
explicit linkages with Hindu majoritarian politics. Under the hard neo-Hindutva label we 
might put groups like the Hindu Yuva Vahini, the Hindu Janjagruti Samiti, Voice of India, 
the Forum for Hindu Awakening, Shri Ram Sena, and various other militant and vigilante 
outfits. These organisations constitute a cluster of individuals and interests that loudly 
expound Hindu chauvinism and cultural nationalism, but are frequently critical of the RSS 
and its associated network (often for being insufficiently proactive and hard-line). The soft 
neo-Hindutva category is inherently more nebulous, and could include the India Foundation 
think tank, and various international groups such as the Hindu Forum of Britain, the National 
Council for Hindu Temples (UK), and the Vedic Foundation in America. Soft neo-Hindutva 
groups are often found in the diaspora, regularly appearing superficially to be mainstream 
representatives of ‘the Hindu community’ in multiculturalist settings, but avoiding overt 
associations with the Hindutva network for diplomatic and pragmatic reasons, out of 
principle and to be, ostensibly, more inclusive.  
But neo-Hindutva is not exactly a schema or framework for categorisation, nor is it a 
typology or taxonomy. The ideology clearly transcends institutions; it has proliferated in the 
media and educational spaces in ways that are difficult to disaggregate; articulations of 
Hindutva-inspired Islamophobia are commonplace in domestic and public spheres where 
previously it was aberrant, much to the consternation of cosmopolitan and secular-minded 
Indians. Neo-Hindutva can be seen as a start-point for thinking about the dynamic and 
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idiosyncratic ways in which Hindu nationalism has evolved over recent years, often into 
increasingly mainstream and normalised (but also obfuscated) forms of rhetoric and 
mobilisation. These trends can be simultaneously global and local, are increasingly expressed 
and negotiated in online spaces, and frequently are manifested through the language of 
blasphemy and offence, the ‘art of being outraged’ (Jaffrelot 2008), and the ‘politics of 
grievance’ (Sutton 2018). Neo-Hindutva can be hybridised and syncretic; both explicitly 
political, and a form of anti-politics (even at the same time). This special issue seeks to 
explore the ways in which Hindu nationalism has developed into new forms and spaces in 
recent years, and sheds light on a powerful and often misunderstood political identity and 
praxis that demands our attention. We hope that it manages to build on a crucial corpus of 
research on communalism in India, while recognising that much of the extant literature does 
not cover the full dynamism and complexity of Hindutva in the 21st century. 
The five articles of this special issue examine the idea of neo-Hindutva from a variety 
of angles: from the Indian courts, IT professionals and media platforms, to how Hindutva is 
adapting to the Northeast and tribal regions of Jharkhand. The issue also highlights the ways 
in which Hindutva ideas travel to other regions of the world, amongst diasporic Indians. In all 
of these articles, new forms of Hindutva are highlighted that show how their malleable and 
dispersed nature has moved away from the traditional militancy often associated with their 
activities. They navigate new spaces, ideas, and practices that reveal their inherent ability to 
fashion themselves anew without giving up on their core views of what it means to be 
‘Hindu’ in an age of globalisation. Whether it is through social media, the courts, economic 
entrepreneurship, yoga, and commodities promoting the health of the nation, or an assertion 
of identity in transnational contexts, Hindutva ideas are now beginning to travel and mould 
its shape according to the host.          
In ‘Court’ing Hindu Nationalism: law and the rise of modern Hindutva’, Saumya 
Saxena shows how the courts become a crucial instrument in adjudicating aspects of what 
constitute ‘religion’ and the ‘secular’. Saxena examines the ‘Hindutva cases’ since the 1990s, 
and in particular the intervention by the Supreme Court in 1995 that acknowledged Hindutva 
as ‘a way of life’. What this did, as Saxena shows us, is to make Hindutva a ‘secular’ 
principle that was adopted by Hindutva workers as ‘nationalist’, or treated synonymously 
with ‘Indianisation or Indian culture’ and therefore different from ‘Hinduism’ as religion. In 
essence, the Supreme Court judgement protected politicians advocating for ‘Hindu’ votes on 
the assumption that these were not religiously motivated (which would lead to trouble with 
the courts for inciting violence through religion), but instead were seen as appealing to a 
constituency of secular voters. The BJP in fact saw this as a move away from sectarian 
interests, and interpreted Hindutva as an idea that is concerned with ‘justice for all’. Through 
these successes, the BJP increasingly uses the courts to deliberate on key ‘national’ issues 
such as a Uniform Civil Code, or in the Hadiya Case, conversion of a Hindu girl to Islam, 
which the government says are a threat to national security, focusing on fraudulent 
conversions, and not related to Hinduism. This ‘secular’ Hindutva tries to achieve what is 
considered ‘Indianisation’, a Hindutva that presents itself as a uniform culture, managing to 
efface differences, assimilating these differences under a singular way of life.  
Arkotong Longkumer’s article – ‘“Nagas can’t sit lotus style”: Baba Ramdev, 
Patanjali, and Neo-Hindutva’ – questions this ‘singular way of life’ promulgated by 
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Hindutva. He examines how yoga, Baba Ramdev, and the consumer brand, Patanjali, 
navigate ideas of citizenship through national and economic interest in the form of promoting 
the health of the nation. Nagaland is a difficult place for Hindutva actors and their nationalist 
designs, because this is a part of the country that has seen conflict, militarisation, and long-
standing demands for sovereignty amongst the indigenous Nagas. Although the activities of 
Patanjali are a recent entry into the region, it highlights the complex ways in which it 
negotiates the idea of the ‘health of the nation’ through state, business, and national 
interests.  Focusing on fieldwork conducted amongst the Patanjali Yog Samiti (local Patanjali 
organisations), Longkumer considers their ideas of what constitutes yoga, food practices, and 
the tension between Patanjali as a secular principle, to ideas articulated by Ramdev that 
explicitly relate to religious and cultural impositions; the paper then moves to swadeshi 
(indigenous goods) to examine the notion of a patriotic consumer. Advanced primarily by 
RSS workers who see Patanjali as an ideal vehicle to bring about an indigenous economy 
focused on local production, they also view swadeshi as cultivating a sustainable community 
that is self-reliant and patriotic. This idea of self-reliance and cultivating an ethical self is 
thus an important feature of how Hindutva ideas manifest themselves through discipline and 
seva (service) in everyday practices over food entrepreneurship and gender empowerment in 
Jharkhand.  
Ketan Alder’s article – ‘Authority, Ethics and Service (Seva) Amongst Hindu 
Nationalists in India’s Assertive Margins’ – shows how seva should not be presented as a 
practice that is self-evidently religious or political, but rather, through engagement with local 
actors of the Vanavasi Kalyan Kendra (VKK – Tribal Welfare Centre), it is linked to 
disciplining everyday conduct on the basis of Hindu ethical norms. He specifically examines 
the making and selling of mahua flowers run by the local VKK sevaks (service workers), that 
are cooked and bottled into chutney, instead of fermenting the flower into alcohol, as is a 
popular practice in parts of rural Jharkhand. By focusing on chutney and not alcohol, the 
VKK sevaks are attempting to create a body politic that is ethical, showing positive character 
traits through disciplining village attitudes. While drinking alcohol, according to Jhulan, a 
part-time sevak, results in laziness, debt, and lack of engagement in labour – all traits that 
could be related to social problems – making mahua chutney provides the rural people with 
discipline, organisation, and entrepreneurship that allows them to access the broader universe 
of Hindu ethical acts inculcated by the VKK. Seva, then, presented in the language of ethics, 
provides the villagers with resources to manage every day conduct into ‘states of “ethical” 
and “disciplined” Hindu acts’.  
The cultivation of a Hindu self resonates particularly in transnational contexts where 
notions of ‘self’ and the ‘other’ are powerful identity markers. Priya Swamy’s article – ‘Neo-
Hindutva Affective Economies: Feelings of pride and offense among Surinamese Hindus in 
the Netherlands’ – demonstrates how Surinamese Hindus in the Netherlands negotiate the 
space of citizenship through notions of Hindutva. Based primarily on ideas of pride and 
offence – two tropes that recur throughout the article (and elsewhere in the special issue) – 
Swamy argues that these ideas find resonance in a variety of examples that shape and 
influence a collective Hindu identity. Unlike much of how ‘Hindu’ identity is constructed in 
India, Surinamese Hindus in fact position themselves in direct opposition to Indian forms of 
being Hindu, instead foregrounding their ‘twice-migrant’ status. Their relationship with India 
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remains ambiguous. Therefore, while Hindutva ideas are not necessarily aligned with the 
political context of Indian Hindutva, the pride in being Hindu that Hindutva creates, and their 
ideas of collective ‘Hindu’ feeling, questions and challenges Surinamese Hindu identity. 
Swamy gives the example of the collective hurt felt around the Holi is Not a Houseparty 
(HNH) campaign and how such examples raise questions for the Surinamese vis-à-vis their 
ideas of Dutch ‘white’ identity. HNH accuses non-Hindus of diluting Holi and by extension 
‘Hindu’ identity, while the Surinamese are then accused of resisting integration into Dutch 
society. The way discourses around citizenship are thus constructed is crucial to what Swamy 
calls the ‘affective economies’ of belonging that Hindutva now accentuates. It is in these 
heightened encounters that Hindutva provides collective energy.  
If one can argue that this collective energy provides an ‘effervescence’ that binds 
group dynamics, nowhere is this more visible than on the internet and social media. Here, it is 
individuals acting out in the vast space of the internet, linking communities on-line and off-
line through affective economies of pride and offence. In ‘Enterprise Hindutva and Social 
Media in Urban India’, Sahana Udupa examines the way media and Hindutva have become 
natural bedfellows, primarily through the way the BJP have utilised social media more than 
any party in the 2014 elections and the subsequent regional-wide elections. Udupa proposes 
‘enterprise Hindutva’ as a trope to discuss how media-savvy individuals are engaged in 
online political activities on Twitter. She discusses the ways in which individual actors – 
educated, urban, and middle-class – navigate the online world by running an anonymous, 
‘trolling’ Twitter handle. They are sympathetic to Hindutva ideas, but not as one would 
imagine them to be. Udupa deftly shows how their online and offline personalities conflict 
when she meets them in person to discuss their Twitter handle. While they can come across 
as difficult and harsh in their online personas, in the offline encounters they present 
themselves as polite, accommodating, and open to discussing issues, even criticism of their 
Hindutva stance. This new group of Hindutva sympathisers are not necessarily the type 
associated with cow vigilantes, those chanting ‘Bharat Mata’, or indeed those with a hatred 
against Muslims or Christians. Certainly, they are Modi supporters, Hindus who are on the 
right of the political spectrum, but they represent the cosmopolitan and middle-class 
landscape of urban India. The internet is a new space where these Hindutva actors can 
flourish, which asks us to expand and extend the remit of Hindutva from what they 
themselves call ‘fringe’ elements (for instance, the militant youth group, the Bajrang Dal) to 
the mainstreaming of Hindutva that comprises different opinions, approaches, and debates.  
These articles complement what Christophe Jaffrelot calls ‘the Saffronisation of the 
public sphere’. In this issue Jaffrelot talks with Edward Anderson about the changing nature, 
and future, of Hindutva through key themes and events. Jaffrelot speaks about his own entry 
into the study of Hindu nationalism, charting its rise from the 1980s onwards when the 
Ayodhya issue was emerging, to the rise and fall of the BJP governments in 1996 and then 
again from 1998-2004, and 2014. Interestingly, Jaffrelot is in a position to view the activities 
of Hindu nationalism over the longue durée – despite the prediction of many that it was 
simply a flash in the pan – and its manifold adaptions in contemporary India. This new 
confidence, since the 2014 election, has given rise to vigilantism. There is a parallel state 
structure appearing, argues Jaffrelot, seen in cow protection vigilantes, supported by those in 
government, which is effecting a Hindu nation. This move, he argues, is the banalisation of 
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Hindu nationalism that is increasingly permeating every aspect of life. Not only is it creating 
a parallel state, but also asymmetrical feelings and calls to devotion infringing on individual 
lives (for example saying ‘Bharat Mata Ki Jai’; or disallowing Muslims from praying 
outdoors). The ‘saffronisation of the public sphere’, then, has a new edge through the surge 
of Hindu nationalism. Will India be a form of ethnic democracy based on the sentiments of 
the majority? What if this majoritarianism becomes further entrenched after the 2019 
elections? These questions, reflected on by Jaffrelot, are increasingly urgent.  
The evolution and transformation of Hindutva considered throughout this special 
issue require us to question and revise many of our previous assumptions. In boxing Hindutva 
into certain categories we are in effect ignoring its dynamism and efficacy, but by 
recognising its power and ability to be malleable and transformative in the spaces it occupies, 
we are taking seriously one of the most important facets of modern Indian history, and 
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